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Bem públicos como motores do crescimento/
desenvolvimento
Resumo
Este artigo enquadra uma reconstrução mais ampla 
da evolução de nossa compreensão da dinâmica 
de uma economia por meio do papel atribuído a 
uma variedade de bens públicos puros e não puros 
(NPPGs) como impulsionadores do desenvolvimento 
e criadores de valor. Nesse sentido, o artigo destaca 
a convergência de duas tradições teóricas distintas, 
embora importantes: as teorias de crescimento e 
desenvolvimento,  por um lado, e o debate sobre o 
papel e a eficiência das empresas estatais e verticais 
integradas vs o  Mercado no fornecimento de bens, 
por outro. Discutem-se as contribuições de Coase 
(1932), que apresentou uma teoria sobre porque um 
deles prevalece, em função de uma ampla categoria 
de custos de transação.
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INTRODUCTION
This paper frames a broader reconstruction of the evolution of our understanding 
of the dynamics of an economythrough the role assigned to a variety of Pure and Non 
Pure Public Goods (NPPGs) as development drivers and value creators. It outlinesthe 
convergence of two distinct, though major theoretical traditions: the theories of 
growth/development, on one side, and the debate over role and efficiency of State/
Vertical Integrated Firms v/s Market in the provision of goods. Coase (1932) put 
forward a theory of why either one prevails, as a function of a broad category of 
transaction costs. Lange proposed that the State could mimic the Market and be 
comparably efficient. Samuelson solved the dilemma through a division of labor, i.e. by 
assigning provision of Public Goods to the State, of Private Goods to market exchange. 
It was time then, that Keynes’ work was still being studied and only tentatively applied. 
Amore recent debate has rejuvenated certain Institutionalist themes, most other 
issues are still in want of adequate solutions. I only provide some hintsabout the latter 
in the conclusions.
I will drive my discussion towards the role in the production and value creation 
process of a variety of (both material and immaterial) Public Goods. They spanobviously 
alarge set, closedby the polar extremes of Pure Public and likewise Pure Private Goods. 
The economies of our lives lie somehow in the middle of such polarity and show a 
rich mixture of goods/properties and institutions to handle them. The discovery of 
this richness and variety has been slow butsteady, fed by both theory and empirical 
evidence. Marriage with growth/development as the latter’sfundamental drivers was 
anatural though only recent outcome. Now it is generally accepted that growthcan 
only be (via) development, and that,asa key policy target, development has to be 
sustainable. For this to obtain, development has to be endogenous, i.e.  based on a social 
agreementand rooted in resources embedded in a territory or a community, most 
often in both of them. Such resources are localor/orshared. (They qualify asNPPGs). 
Analysis of experiences of local development (at the territorial, regional, district levels, 
for instance) have been fundamental in generatingour new awareness.
Section 1 recalls the definition of goods’ properties accepted by the economists 
and introduces the issue of public goods’ governance, while in Sect. 2, Non Pure Public 
Goods (my main focus) are defined as the union set of Local (as belonging) Public 
Goods (LPGs) and Common Pool Resources (CPRS), resources that are shared. Public 
Goods, originally consumers’ goods, have been re-conceptualized as production 
resources by Hardy and Ostrom, and this  surprisingly  leads (sect. 3) to an overview of 
the theory (better, theories) of growth. The latter’s evolution and final crossbreeding 
with the analysis of a variety of experiences of local development, have expanded the 
realm of NPPGs (reviewed in Section 4), opening up new vistas on production and 
distribution, examined in the concluding Section 5. 
55v.6, n.2, p.53-69, 2018
Public goods as drivers of growth/development
ON THE NATURE OF GOODS, THE WAY ECONOMISTS SEEIT
(Pure) Public Goods (PGs)were born as”collective consumption goods” (Samuelson, 
1954), defined in terms of the property of static non-rivalry, i.e. goods for whichthe cost 
of having a marginal consumer is zero,though her/his benefit be positive. However, 
nobody will want to contribute proportionally to his individual benefit to the cost of 
provision. Or, she/he has no economic incentive to reveal her benefit and be charged 
accordingly. Acontribution problem arises, dual to the revelation one. Non-rivalry leads 
generally to free riding behavior on the part of selfish individuals and a decentralized 
market institution or pricing scheme becomes impossible. The solution to problem 
posed by non-rivalry was seen (in Samuelson and later) in the state provision of 
public goods. The theory of Pure Public Goods became the theory of Government 
expenditure1. A second property to define PGs was added, i.e. that no consumer could 
be excluded from its consumption. Hence, no profit-motivated agent would have 
an incentive to produce and/or to maintain one such good, as hecould not rip any 
monetary or else benefit. Non excludable goods would be condemned to be under-
produced or not be produced at allby the private sector (an incentive compatibility 
problem). This added more arguments to the cause in favor ofa public provision of 
Public Goods, to the point they became identified with State, in a sort of division of 
labor with market/private goods.
In the final (Samuelson/Musgrave) agenda, PGs are (basically) consumption goods 
entering  utility functions, and the organization of their production was not discussed 
being a task for the fiscal budget.Both non-rivalry and non-excludability generate 
externalities, though different. For non-rival goods the marginal social benefit is the sum 
of the marginal benefits of all consumers, the more they are the higher it is. This implies 
the existence of a social reason to share consumption/usage to maximize social net 
benefits, extendingat no extra-cost the enjoyment  of a positive externality.  There is, in 
other words,a social bonus to non-rival goods. 
Was such analternative of market/private goodseconomy versus state/public 
goods economy, a trap? It took a long logicalprocess and a number of steps to realize it.
First, it wasdiscoveredthat economic goodswere not as simple, locked in the 
duality private/public: they spanned varieties, were continuously multiplied by social/
institutional and economic processes, and hadmany more economically relevant 
characteristics. Reflection took three directions.
1.  The first led toa re-visitation of the concepts of (non)excludability and (non)
rivalry. A non-excludable good is one for which excludability is unfeasible or has an 
infinite cost. Thus, excludability is a matter, on top of feasibility, of costlyinstitutions (see, 
for instance Pagano and Vaitero (2015)), and it is a typically social construct (as defined 
in Wikipedia).  With non-excludable goods, un-cooperating agents enjoy (positive 
and/or negative) externalities. 
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The decision of making a good excludable implies setting up a set of rights (see e.g. 
Mello (2016) and an enforcing mechanism (together, they make a system of property 
right(s). The degree of excludability is increasing in the cost of such a system. 
In between excludable and non-excludable goods, are partially excludable goods, 
for which the cost of exclusion is finite. Economies that are intermediate between the 
Pure Public and the Pure Private one, can also be organized (Buchanan’s Clubs and 
Tiébout’s cities are classical examples to be discussed later).
 Likewise, one should distinguish between static rivalry and inter-temporal rivalry. 
The discussion only focused on the former type only. But while excludability ismost 
often  an institutional property which may depend on its technological feasibility, 
(non)rivalry is often in the nature of the good, or it is dueto the latter being given in 
finite quantities, i.e. as it is  nature-made (a natural resource), or in any case if it is a stock 
at a point of time. That PGs are characterized by non-rivalry, is tantamount to saying 
that they have infinite carrying capacity (as resources) or that the opportunity cost of 
having a marginal user is nil.
In between rival and nonrival goods are partially rival goods that can be defined in 
terms of  their carrying capacity and/or of the opportunity cost .
I) either they have a finite Carrying Capacity, CC,
II) or the opportunity cost of the marginal user is at least as high as the  positive 
cost of provision.
The notion of CC is more appropriate when dealing with a (natural, man-made) 
resource stocks for production purposes. Any available amount has its defined CC, at 
least in principle. The notion of Opportunity Cost for the marginal user, on the other 
hand, seems to be more appropriate when considering consumer’s goods. Thus, more 
generally, one can define degrees of rivalry.
Later on, more classes of non-excludable goods were found2, supporting the view 
that non excludability is neither a technological nor an immutable, naturally inbuilt 
property”. In this sense it is inherently different from (non) rivalry. 
2. Global Public Goods were then identified as a public good “that (…) is available 
more-or-less worldwide.” (or rather, conceptually construed) , and, thus, implicitly local 
public goods appeared. Public (as well as private) goods had to be qualified in terms of 
how far their characteristic reaches.
3. Finally, the opposition between state and marketas arrangementswas no longer 
generally applicable, to begin with, because both of them can be inefficient. In certain 
cases, organizations alternative to either one can be conceived and well function. While 
for global public goods it is difficult to think and set up (supranational) governance 
bodies, many other public goods are successfully produced in the private sector. 
While the discovery of global public goods forces us to think to what extent goods 
belong, the reconsideration of alternative goods provision arrangements opens the 
gate to  rethinking the institutions set up to care for resources and organize their 
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reproduction. Astrong awareness hasthis way emerged of the existence of a new 
societal structure with multiple institutional layers, evolved to create manifoldnon 
material goods and to cater for new necessities (a new medieval like society, according 
to Desai).
At the end, it was the issue of (non)-excludability that resulted disturbing (for it 
undermined a markets arrangement) and therefore attracted the most attention. 
It better fitted with the then current discussion of externalities focusing on the 
implications for distinct governance structures and pricing schemes, in the General 
Equilibrium and Pigou’s traditions.3In ensuing research, the collective action problem 
associated with the non-excludability of  PGs will find solution alternative to state 
provision, bysimply moving  them into the (sub)set of excludable goods.
Since the very beginning, the conceptual debate private/public goods got 
restricted to  governance issues. The positive externalities generated by non-rivalry for 
society were entirely forgotten.
ON NON-PURE PUBLIC GOODS, NPPGS
Puregoods are those holdingboth characteristics globallyin the sense of ergaomnes. 
There are plenty of goods, as we have seen, holdingeither one of the properties of the 
private goods but not both. in this sense they can be treated together with the public 
ones. This is the case fornon-excludability, of course,on which research concentrated 
for it prevents the functioning of a proper market mechanism. For this reason only, we 
will define Non-Pure PGs, NPPGs, some Local, some Commons. 
1. The notion of Local Public Goods(LPGs) was a by product of addressing a specific 
question: under what conditions can one replicate the market so as to efficiently 
handle public goods as consumers’ goods? To reach such aresult, PGs had  to be made 
excludable, but they also hadto become local in some sense, to retain non-rivalry. The 
issue ofproduction organization now emerges, LPGs are socially produced; on the other 
hand, they remain final products forconsumers’ welfare.
In (Buchanan’s) club economies, members pool together resources to generate 
societal externalities. Sharing the cost of producing public services, privatizing the 
production of public goods “to bridge the gap” with private goods, was one chosen 
way to reintroduce excludability. Club theory solves the problem of the individual’s 
contribution (through a membership fee) while incentive compatibility issue cannot 
arise as LPGs are non-rival within the club. Participating in the cost of the public 
good production yields the right to access them. The cost of excludingis finite and 
low, rivalry may arise when crowding or congestion exist: it is prevented byfixing an 
optimalmembership size. Clubs are therefore local structures in a non-geographical 
sense, while Tiébout‘s “settlements” or towns” are chosen on the basis of the prospective 
net benefits (public goods provision net of taxes), thus their taxpayment buys the right 
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to (non) exclusion. Produced Public goods are non-excludable for taxpayers, the town 
residents (thus, they are geographically local), non-taxpayers are excluded.
Both types of excluding structures articulatethe social spacebut do not solve the 
non-revelation problem connected with non-rivalry. To members/residents, locally 
produced and provided PGs while in principle non-rival, the risk of congestion 
looms. Rivalry moves into the local level, where socially produced services are jointly 
consumed. 
2.  The above discussion moves us from a world of consumers of socially produced 
final output/externalities, to the world of the administrators of socialized production 
resources, the dual world of Hardy and Ostrom.
The prediction of the Tragedy of the Commons is founded on the selfish behavior 
of economic agents, as well as on the non-excludability to an exhaustible finite 
resource, commons that are treated as res nullius, or open access resources, OARs. Non 
exclusion is here the key, being costly (infinitely or else unfeasible, just as in public 
goods, for OARs) or finite but high (so as to make it impractical, in Common Pool 
Resources, CPRs, as a subset of OARs). In either cases, a degree of rivalry is associated, 
as high usage (subtraction”) may generate degeneration of the resource (resulting 
in a  form of congestion) and a lowering of individual’s benefits, depending on the 
carrying capacity of the resource system. Here, congestion does not ignite an automatic 
controlling mechanism, the number of users/the level of individual usagebeing by 
definition unrestricted. It has to find other institutional solutions.
The problem was seen (Ostrom) to rest on (the treatment and assumption of) non 
excludability: CPRs do have stakeholders, i.e. formally or informally defined holders 
of certain rights, therefore “Although tragedies have undoubtedly occurred  it is also 
obvious that for thousands of years people have self-organized to manage common-pool 
resources, and users often do devise long-term, sustainable institutions for governing 
these resources (….). An important lesson from the empirical studies of sustainable 
resources is that more solutions exist than Hardin’s state intervention proposed4. The 
notion of CPRs5shifts the attention towards investment and maintenance, and from 
the short to the long run horizon of the participating agents (thus incorporating 
sustainability issues). Public Goods are finally recognized as productive resources, and 
PGs consumers have become producers with the task of being their custodians for the 
long run. Historical evidence shows this bottom up approach to governance to be not 
only feasible, but often superior to other governance arrangements. 
We are still within a traditional problematic, though, local communities are only 
shown to be better at solving the collective action problem. Governance continues to 
occupy the center of the stage.  
A new research agendawas born, listing high in its priorities the redefinition of 
access as bundle of rights, and the identification of structures suitable to solve the collective 
action problem linked guaranteeing the sustainable use of shared resources.
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At this point of evolution of the economists’ reflection, it is natural to look at the 
production implications of the fact that all such non pure public goodsare (or can 
be) production resources. Marrying the theory of NPPGs with the theories of growth 
and development was the natural accomplishment of various analyses, from local 
development to those on production/innovation, and the role of technology and 
knowledge. 
ON PUBLIC GOODS AT THE BIRTH OF THE NEO-CLASSICAL 
THEORY OF GROWTH
Being exogenous in  an aggregate model (the Neo Classical growth model), 
Technical Progress (TP) is freely accessible (non-excludable) while naturally non rival.TP 
is thus a pure Public Good (Romer, 1993, 1994), perhaps not a surprise given the time 
coincidence with work on a similar topic, e.g. Samuelson’s). As a consequence, growth 
is viewed as a globally homogeneous or standard process, and globalization becomes 
its corollary. Expectations of cross country convergence, catching up and similar 
phenomena (on which development theoryhad dwelled), were naturally raised.
Such predictions, it is now known, proved to be not substantiated by the reality of 
cross country differential growth performance: a hot debated showed that divergence 
(conditional convergence, club convergence, etc.), rather than (unconditional) 
convergence implied by the NC theory, were the new stylized facts, facts though that 
had been taken for granted and to be explained in the development agenda. Thus, 
when searching for the drivers of economic performance got seriously under way, 
Growth theory got closer and eventually merged with Development theory. Still in 
search of a macro explanation, many things happened to growth theory, among them 
the reconsideration of the concept of productive capital and of the law of diminishing 
returns on which Neo-Classical theory rested. For our purposes, though, what is 
important is that growth theory went from exogenous to endogenous, and discovered 
the existence of a variety of growth/development models in a large Empirics of Growth 
and had to be explained.
Endogeneisation of TP has beenone type ofreactionto those empirical findings. It 
also satisfied the theoretical demand for an explanation of the growth driver, TP: it was 
made the result  (intentional as a produce, or unintentional acting as an externality) of 
the profit-seeking activity of production. At the same time, a large literature sprung up 
on Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs), to explain how to appropriate profit enhancing 
intellectual production, and finding the reason in the incentive problem. 
In both cases, the solution to the problem issuing from the treatment of TP was 
by moving it from the realm of the pure to that of Non-PurePublic Goods: excludable, 
though it could not be deprived of non-rivalry. The latter then was converted in the 
generator of increasing returns to scale: kept at the firms’ level, non competitive markets 
were necessary. On the other hand, the flourishing growth empirics led to recognize that 
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successful development is basicallyan endogenous process, i.e. based on idiosyncratic 
resources, resources that in some sense belong; hence, sustained long run development 
is to be married with sustainability. Development/growth policies became broadly 
defined cultural policies (or better, cultural policy became development policy) aimed 
at endogenous development and sustainable development became conceived as a 
social path, and not just an environmental solution. Governing such a process with the 
necessary social support became central.
The new research and policy agendathat was emerging, was pivoting on i) a 
redefinition of  the set of NPPGs as production resources, and ii) a reflection on the 
connected issues of production organization, value creation and distribution.
THE EXPANDING REALM NPPGS AS GROWTH  DRIVERS
Neither the exogenous nor the endogenous explanation of the growth experience 
proved (to some) satisfactory enough, both sharing the focus on the mechanics of 
capital accumulation, however defined. Theorists went in search of deep(-er) growth 
determinants (a notion due to D. North) and looked at Institutions, Geography, or 
Culture, automatically accounting for the diversity of the growth experience. The lives 
of townships and the structured landscapes (of Tiébout), the voluntary associations 
(of Buchanan), and the communities (of  Hardy & Ostrom), all producing a wealth 
of NPPGs, themselves being NPPGs, exhibit a widevariety. Thus, new production 
resourceswere discovered in LocalPublic Goods and Commons: resources that belong 
and resources that are shared, all of them rooted in a material or virtual location, a 
human landscape. This realized, finally, the marriage of growth/development with the 
theory of goods/resources, but those discoveries are due basically to analysis of local 
development. (Well before, technology itself has been treated as a club good to explain 
convergence of groups of countries, in the works e.g. of Quah and Durlauf.)
Presentation is now organized around two points of entry (a third one being the 
previous discussion of appropriation of produced knowledge to which I will come 
back in a while)6.
Point of entry A: conceptualizing resources that belong: 
(Anthropological) Culture/Institutions/knowledge and Territory.
1. Culture in the anthropological sense is a community-based local NPG for it 
belongs to a given people. Similarly to a club good, it is the produce of the voluntary 
association of  groups of individuals who identify with it (the theme of cultural identity) 
and collectively enjoy it. It is excludable for individuals not belonging to a givengroup 
refer to a distinct identity and are not automatically admitted (current events show): 
in this sense, culture can be (made) exclusive. On the other hand, Culture differs from a 
club good in that, at least in principle, congestion cannot arises. As a resource, however, 
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it is idiosyncratic, non-transferable (and thus cannot be transplanted7), non-reproducible 
in the short term. A copious literature shows that how it determines behavior, economic 
outcomes, and thence growth performance.
Supporting evidence has emerged in a number of settings, perhaps beginning 
with thedebate about the so called East Asian Miracle in which capital accumulation 
explanations (e.g. Stigliz, A. Young) confronted Culture/Institutions-based 
interpretations (focusing e.g. on the role of Confucianism, in the footsteps of Weber 
and Veblen, Morishima, or the Institutions Wade, etc.). Empirical evidence, on the other 
hand, led to a reconsideration of Culture and its functions through Social Institutions, 
it also led to works on the relationship between beliefs/religion and economic 
outcomes.
2. Culture is conceptualized also as a growth enhancing, community-specific, hence 
public capital asset, i.e.
• Social capitalas features of social organization such as trust, norms of 
reciprocity and networks of civil engagement“ (Coleman, 1990, also Dasgupta 
and Segeldin (2000) and extensively used to explain differential economic 
performance, e.g. by Putnam’s (1993) on Italian communities;
• Appropriate Institutions, providing the right incentives for investment and 
innovation, hence growth (a notion originally introduced by D. North, further 
elaborated by Acemoglu et als.);
• Institutional Capital (by Ostrom).8
3. Culture is seen as a strategic resourcein relation to creativity and innovation, the 
flywheel of economic development, for its capacity of producing new knowledge and 
on the way to generate novelty and renewal.” (Lazzeretti, (2009)
4. Finally, reexamination recognized Knowledge as a complex body comprising 
both formal (hence, codifiable, costless-ly transmittable) and informal or tacit (hence, 
non-codifiable) knowledge, the latter being a sticky resourcethat is embedded 
into a territory and/or to a community. This was the result of evolutionary thinking, 
beginning the well-known contribution of Nelson and Winter (1982), but going back 
to the works of Polanyi.
THE HUMANLY STRUCTURED TERRITORY IS THE NEXT LPGS 
FOR ADISCUSSION WHERE DIFFERENT VIEWS APPEAR.
5. Territory is a factor for competitive edge in the era of globalization. In sorting out the 
manifold relationship between endogenous (sustainable) development and territorial 
specificity, reviewing the industrial district experience as complex learning systems, 
structured so as to respond to an unstable global economic atmosphere.  In particular, 
some such districts (associated with Marshall’s analysis) are samples of production 
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organization feeding and embedded into the social arrangements and thus the 
cultural capital of a local community. In connection Territorial Capital appeared, of 
which tacit knowledge is a fundamental component.
6. Territory as the territorial milieu structured by human life, anessential notion 
slowly surfacing from the New Geography, the birth of an Evolutionary Approach 
to Geography, the revival of  Regional Economics as  “the economics of synergy 
laden systems of physical and relational assets” (see works ofthe new Geography, 
e.g. by Storper and  Scott). Such landscape is now populated not just be voluntary 
aggregations, driven by cost benefit calculation, but by hubs of human interaction, 
cities and villages, where proximity produces culture and through it innovation.
7.  The territory as the site of a social-cultural and natural pact among the three 
players, community-nature and economic activity, in a territorial project of auto-
sustentabilityof the Territorialist School (a notion due to Magnaghi (2010) after Giddes)
Point of entry B: ConceptualizingNew (from Old) Commons.
The historic research on Old Commons is aboutHardy’s agenda, the Tragedy, 
and thus on solving the governance problem, by introducing two distinct elements: 
restricting access and creating incentives (usually by assigning individual rights to, or 
shares of, the resource) for users to invest in the resource instead of overexploiting it.
The New literature on Commons started from the observation of the inherent 
contradiction between privatization and increasing interdependence implied by 
the process of  globalization , “Globalization is often associated with increased 
privateness (…). But it is also — perhaps even quintessentially — about increased 
publicness —about people’s lives becoming more interdependent.”, (Kaul, 2003).
Thus, the rise of New Commonsis reactions to globalization/commodification 
(Hess, Kaul & Stigliz). The need has arisen to take such apparent contradictory dimension 
into account, i.e. first of all accommodating new emerging values. New Commons 
are, on the other hand, continuously produced by the New technologies, and by the 
New Modes of Production  that they make possible for people to invent, explore and 
implement.
Re-inventing the commons leads to a definition
A commons is a resource shared by a group where the resource is vulnerable 
to enclosure, overuse and social dilemmas, thus the new commons hold the same 
property (non- excludability) of the old commons, as well as the rivalry property. 
Unlike a public good, it requires management and protection in order to sustain it. 
From the map provided by Hess (2008) to navigate in an archipelago of diverse 
Commons9, two of them, Cultural and Knowledge Commons, are worth being singled 
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out, as they share the property of being immaterial resources and, like public goods, 
have infinite carrying capacity.
As for Knowledge Commons, “Since the modern commons’ resource is information, 
the tragedy of the commons has no effect within the knowledge commons —
information does not depreciate when being shared with others.”  Rivalry does not 
arise, and with it the social dilemma of having free riders around.
Likewise, and again unlike typical common-pool resources, (…), Cultural 
Commons are non rival in consumption. (…) Nevertheless, being shared by a group 
of individuals, culture still represents a common resource and at least its provision 
involves ” at least two classes of  social dilemma.  In addition to the one related with 
free riding (descending from non-rivalry), there is a second dilemma, that refers to 
the reproduction of the cultural resource, creating uncertainty in the transmission of 
the commons to the next generation. The fading of new ideas nurturing the cultural 
community can make the culture of the commons stationary, or a language can die, an 
artists community can dissolve.”
Cultural and Knowledge commons are produced and shared.  How is it possible? 
ECONOMIES: PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTIONWITH NPPGS
According our definition, the subset of NPPGs that are excludable identifies goods 
that belong to somebody, (i.e. club members, residents of the classical literature; 
culturally homogeneous groups, human and natural landscapes; cities as hubs of 
creativity through proximity and exchange). The subset of non-excludable ones, on the 
other hand, identifies goods that may be shared by a group of people, e.g. stakeholders 
whenever certain rights are attributed to them formally or informally (arable commons 
of the basically natural resources collectively managed; grass root institutions for the 
provision of welfare enhancing services; large knowledge-sharing projects). They share 
a social dimension.
Accordingly, two economiescan be defined. The belonging economy is populated 
by voluntary and exclusive associations that are local in a virtual and/or physical sense 
(e.g. parks, territories, culture as above defined;  in addition to the settlements and 
the clubs). Expected benefits are the incentive to join in, public goods are made 
available only to associates/residents. In the sharing economy, collectively produced 
(New Commons) or collectively maintained public goods (CPRs: the arable Commons) 
i.e. natural or man-made resources in given amounts, are shared by non-exclusive 
communities, which bear the economic and social burden of their maintenance. 
Access is open and often promoted, as it solicits voluntary contribution according to 
one’s motivation. This may benot a monetary reward but the social welfare.
In the former economies, the level of PGs provision is fixed by pooled or available 
resources. In the latter economy, PGs supply is adjusted to demand. In both of them, 
NPPG resources are exposed to the danger of overuse and deterioration. Correct 
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sustainable management and maintenance may generate value added that feeds into 
production and welfare functions. Collective involvement is its necessary condition. 
In this perspective, one sees Hardin’s finite, non-reproducible resource againstmost 
NPPGs thatare produced, thus in principle reproducible. There is a third alternative to 
the one advocated by Hardy, with an inbuilt incentive to pursue it (the creation of a 
surplus) through social collaboration.  
The discussion has shown how often voluntary association/local governance 
solutions perform better than either stateor market. Guiding us out of the conventional 
antinomy, we may consider differenteconomies and production organizations.
Three questions arise, though, not all of them tackled in the literature. Here come 
our hints for future research.
1. Are there mechanisms that guarantee such result? The analysis of such mechanisms 
was Ostrom’s own contribution, but it is not clear how far one can generalize it.
2. As NPPGs are not simply consumer goods, but often inputs in production 
processes, how is their contribution (the value added mentioned above) accounted 
for? That’s why and when they act as growth drivers: growth drivers are those that 
(contribute to) create value. Remember: exogenous TP produces value sustaining long 
term growth but, being a  Pure Public Good, it need not be remunerated. Intentionally 
produced TP (and generally knowledge) made exclusive through intellectual property 
rights, generates an extra income that accrues naturally to the holders of the patents. 
How do we go about now, with NPPGs resources that are neither one? 
3. What are the principle of this redistribution when resources are collectively owned?
It is useful to recall that suchbundle of issues arose out ofextensive empirical 
research. There development has been, finally,  recognized as a fundamentally local 
process with certain triggering and sustaining mechanisms, pivoting on Non Private 
Goods.
Such conceptual origin yields some hints to answer them.
1. All NPPGs share the property of non-rivalry within the limits set by the possible 
congestion. Theory wants that such non rivalry lead to their under production or non 
production, thus supplying the ground to justifythe (second) enclosure movement 
currently going on (Boyle, 2003). Instead, reality of the NPPGs economies shows that 
their production can take place and that it often relies on novel collaborative forms of 
organization, the realm of NPPGs being continuously expanded through these forms 
of organization. In the case of knowledge, it is often based on a (networked) peer system 
that is neither firm- nor market-like: it has a decentralized structure where incentives do 
not come from appropriability.10 The peer commons-based production is an alternative 
(the third model) to Coase’s antinomy, something similar to the gifts exchange of certain 
anthropological research (Benkler, 2002).
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2. Non-excludability of the Commons has directed privileged attention to issues 
ofgovernance (clubs and settlement solving it implicitly), and therefore towards 
the organization of production. But production raises another question as both 
people and resources are involved: if NPPGs are productive resources should they be 
remunerated and in case how ? Dual to the contribution problem related with the 
free riding behavior in consumption, there is, in production, a distribution problem 
to resource stakeholders. In more traditional terms, often but not with all PPGs!, 
the latter can be conceptualized in terms of externalities that some such resources 
generate to the whole production system. It does not seem that all NPPGs’effects can 
be accommodated in this notion. Thus, if such a concept cannot be generalized, the 
solution is far from clear.
3. But, first, what is the nature of the contribution of NPPGs (the topic picked upin 
Kasliwal (2016).
It can only be a generalized form of rent for it is generated by production resources 
being immobile, specific, and nor reproducible, at least in the short term. Thus, they are 
resources that  in some senseare rooted and, though they are not private, they socially 
belong. This fact is often synthetized by talking of territorial or cultural value added, 
which would have economic value though it is not produced by individual efforts.
Before being able to extract it, in a situation where there are by definition no 
property rights on the basis of which to claim extraction, such contribution has to be 
economically recognized and factored  into the price of final output, and  those entitled 
to a share have to be identified, too. One may call the former, valorization (in fact, it is 
often value generation), for which some mechanism has to be put in place (often with 
the intervention of UNESCO, and tourism): final output price has to be higher than 
the sum of private inputs contributions, however computed. The latter is onemore 
complicated story: How can one own what by definition cannot be owned (Hess, 2008).
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Two approaches (the easiest) are generally implemented:
• Expropriation of the rent generating resource, i.e. making it private. Extraction 
and entitlement identification are solved at once. This transforms the 
resource whose services contribute to a society’s production to what is called 
a firm augmenting resource. This generates to the new owner, under various 
headings, monopolistic or extra profits, royalties etc. It is the most common 
solution, not always possible and often not the best, socially speaking.
• State control via ownership and licensing, or taxation that skims the rent 
(partially or totally) of private firms revenues, and hopefully returns it later on 
to community. 
We have to count on a benevolent state with redistributive policies for in either 
case, the rent recognized the surplus in a socialized production.
BY WAY OF CONCLUDING
Culture, Knowledge, Institutions, Territory have attracted the economists’ attention 
in recent years, while looking for the “fundamental (North’s) explanations” of differential 
economic performance. They all have been seen for what they are: some pure public 
goods, some Commons, some of the Club-type. As Boyle’s students say, cultural and 
scientific Commons are all over the places. They all share a second relevant aspect: 
they are complex goods. E.g. social norms do not come alone, isolated from the context 
of accepted social behavior. Institutions span a structure. Knowledge is a body, etc. 
The view for the sustainability of development, through the care of these 
“fundamental drivers”, further highlights this latter aspect. Thus, even when we talk 
of natural resources as Physical Commons, they appear to be strongly interconnected 
in wholes, structured landscapes: each counts as an individual resource, and as a 
component of the local environment. Ostrom did the first step in their treatment, 
recognizing many of them as Commons; Robert Ware did (with others, e.g. Stiglitz and 
Mazzucato) the next, the recognition of their deep interrelation.
It should be clear, at this point of reading, that most of my previous argument 
serves a twofold purpose: first, to review a growing literature in its logico-historical 
evolution only in order to identify problems and unsolved issues. There are many, and 
I am not going to resume and make a list of them. The bottom line of this argument is 
that public goods, one for being a large and expanding variety, next for being diverse 
with also diverse origins, are still relatively or little understood by the economists. 
Perhaps, this has contributed to the fact that only recently they have received due 
attention. But once “discovered”, i.e. once a Pandora-like lid has been lifted, it cannot be 
put down again tohide the story. Lots of issues emerge to the surface and have to be 
dealt with, some of them have been considered above, more are on the table before 
our eyes.
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Notes 
1 “When Samuelson took up the concept in the 1950s, economists and the world at large favored an active 
role for the state in the economy (...). Keynesian macroeconomics and Pigouvian welfare economics were 
basic to the paradigm, and many countries practiced planning and state control of the economy. Thus 
it was in a way natural to presume a large role for the state in the provision of public goods. Such a role 
was a response to a presumed preference on the part o the public for public goods.” (Desai, in Kaul, 2003)
2 “There are goods that are inherently public by design. (…) A third type (…), there are goods that are public 
by default, either due to lack of foresight or knowledge in the design.”( Kaul et als. (2003)).
3 The possibility of overcoming the inefficiencies from externalities through bargaining among affected 
parties was first discussed by R. Coase in “The Problem of Social Cost” (1960). 
4 “The possibility of producing “order without law” and, thus, sometimes governing the commons without 
tragedy, has also fascinated scholars of contemporary land use. R. C. Ellickson (1991): “The prediction 
that resource users are led inevitably to destroy CPRs is based on a model that assumes all individuals 
are selfish, norm-free, and maximizers of short-run results. This model explains why market institutions 
facilitate an efficient allocation of private goods and services, and it is strongly supported by empirical 
data from open, competitive markets in industrial societies (..). However, predictions based on this model 
are not supported in field research or in laboratory experiments in which individuals face a public good or 
CPR problem and are able to communicate, sanction one another, or make new rules (21).” (Ostrom (1991, 
p.20; see also Ostrom, 2003).
5 “….to refer to resource systems regardless of the property rights involved. CPRs include natural and 
human- constructed resources in which (i) exclusion of beneficiaries through physical and institutional 
means is especially costly, and (ii) exploitation by one user reduces resource availability for others (Ostrom, 
1991, p. 13)
6 To make more concrete our presentation, we will introduce some references to an extensive literature, 
without in any sense these being exhaustive.
7 That Culture could not be transplanted, led to a revision of the development approach.
8 In (…) Putnam’s et als (1993) emphasis is on one form of social capital, civic participation. Strong 
traditions of civic engagement are the hallmarks of social cohesion and, in turn, economic progress, 
argues Putnam. Elinor Ostrom (1990), equates social capital with the richness of social organization. She 
emphasizes institutional capital, defined as the supply of organizational ability and social structures, 
literally the “capital” of institutions that a society has at its disposal. 
9 New commons (NC) are various types of shared resources that have recently evolved or have been 
recognized as commons. They are commons without pre-existing rules or clear institutional arrangements. 
(…) Tacking new commons over several years has demonstrated that this vast arena is inhabited by 
heterogeneous groups from divergent disciplines, political interests, and geographical regions that are 
increasingly finding the term “commons” crucial in addressing issues of social dilemmas, degradation, and 
sustainability of a wide variety of shared resources. The resource sectors include scientific knowledge, 
The difficulties with all kinds of public goods have been tried to be solved by 
“privatizing them”: in other words, by trying to make for them some of those missing 
markets. I do not want to enter an assessment of what has been the success of this 
attempt, but of course we all know that markets are per se imperfect allocational 
mechanisms (wealth distribution of the recent years has made this evident). This is 
increasingly perceived by the public at large, who as a result is seeking for alternative 
solutions.
The above discourse is more the announcement of the tentative lines of a research 
project than a fully blown, mature reflection. Thus, its key message, if any, is that non-
market goods are all over our economic life and that they do make it possible. Markets 
are only one of the solutions mankind has invented to deal with the distribution of 
goods and services. It is not the unique one solution nor it has been, historically. But, 
perhaps, neither they have to be the unique model solution for our future. 
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voluntary associations, climate change, community gardens, Wikipedias, cultural treasures, plant seeds, 
and the electromagnetic spectrum. All of these new resource sectors and communities require rigorous 
study and analysis in order to better grasp the institutional nature of these beasts. (Hess,  2008).
10 Thus, “A new model of production has taken root, one that should not be there (…) which reveals its 
superiority in terms of information circulation and in particular (human) resources allocation, effectively 
dealing with situations where the process can be fragmented and a number of people can contribute 
marginally with a variety of motivations”. Benkler (2002)
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